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THE NEW SINGAPORE MEDIATION
CONVENTION: THE PROCESS AND
KEY CHOICES†*
Hal Abramson**
This article presents the backstory of the New Singapore Me-
diation Convention, which is really two stories: one on the multi-
party negotiation process that produced the Convention and one
on the substantive choices in the Convention.  The two stories also
illustrate the relationship between a well-designed process and
result.
The most important milestone of this story occurred on Febru-
ary 9, 2018 when Working Group II of the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) finished
almost three years of drafting the Convention.  On that day, Work-
ing Group II recommended a draft convention that would facilitate
cross-border compliance with settlement agreements that result
from qualifying mediations.  The purpose of the Convention would
be to offer a simpler and more expeditious alternative for enforc-
ing mediated settlement agreements than expensive and uncertain
breach of contract litigation.  In December 2018, the United Na-
† This article is based on a book chapter written by the author and published in MEDIATION
IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Catharine Titi & Katia Fach-
Gomez eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2019).
* You will notice that the word “enforcement” is not used in the title of this article, in this
article (with a couple exceptions), or in the title of the Convention. The Convention is formally
entitled “United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from
Mediation” and will be known as the “Singapore Convention on Mediation.” For more
information, see U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade
Law, Fifty-first session, U.N. Doc. A/73/17, annex I (2018) [hereinafter Singapore Convention].
Common law attorneys will likely be surprised by this language choice even though the
Convention fashions a process for “enforcing” cross-border mediated settlement agreements.
Civil law lawyers also are likely to be surprised that the familiar phrase “recognition” is omitted
in the Convention and replaced by a functional definition in the Convention. The background on
this language choice is explained under Section III where the five-point compromise called “The
Compromise” is described.
** Professor of Law, Touro Law Center, New York. Served as a delegate for International
Mediation Institute (IMI) and International Academy of Mediators (IAM) at the UNCITRAL
Working Group II drafting meetings on the Singapore Mediation Convention. He has written
extensively on mediation and negotiations and serves as a commercial mediator. For biography,
see www.tourolaw.edu/faculty/abramson. The author wants to recognize the valuable comments
on earlier drafts by Corinne Montineri and Tim Schnabel. The author also wants to thank Car-
dozo Law School research assistant, Nicholas Gliagias, for diligent work checking and formatting
footnotes.
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tions General Assembly formally adopted the Singapore Mediation
Convention.
What is UNCITRAL?
For those less familiar with UNCITRAL, you might find help-
ful this brief description before reading anything else.  UNCI-
TRAL was established by the UN General Assembly to help
harmonize and modernize the law of international trade and com-
mercial law.  UNCITRAL’s sixty state members are elected by the
General Assembly and selected to ensure representation by geo-
graphic regions and principal economic and legal systems.  As an
organ of the General Assembly, UNCITRAL follows the General
Assembly’s rules of procedures for its sessions and working groups.
UNCITRAL determines its work program based on proposals re-
ceived from States or organizations.  It sets its own agenda, reviews
the work of its various working groups to which the Commission
assigns projects, and prepares reports, models laws, and conven-
tions for the UN.
This mediation settlement initiative was assigned by the Com-
mission to Working Group II, which formerly focused on “Arbitra-
tion,” then was expanded to cover “Arbitration and Conciliation,”
and currently is named “Dispute Settlement.”  Any recommenda-
tions from Working Group II are sent to UNCITRAL for its adop-
tion, and any proposed conventions, as occurred in this case, are
first sent to UNCITRAL and then to the General Assembly for
consideration and adoption.1
This article focuses primarily on the deliberations of Working
Group II when drafting the mediation settlement convention.
My Vantage Point
At the outset, I should explain my vantage point.  I present
these two stories from the perspective of an active “observer,” not
as a member of a country delegation.  I represented two NGOs
(non-governmental organizations) with observer status, Interna-
tional Mediation Institute (“IMI”) and International Academy of
1 UNCITRAL, A GUIDE TO UNCITRAL: BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 6, para. 48 (2013).
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Mediators (“IAM”),2 attended most of the drafting meetings over
the three-year process, and participated in multiple discussions.  I
also served as an “expert consultant.”  In that capacity, I organized
and moderated three mediation education programs for delegates
and the public under the auspice of UNCITRAL.3  Finally, I also
bring the perspective of an arbitrator, mediator, and full-time aca-
demic in the field of dispute resolution for over 25 years and au-
thor of multiple publications on negotiations, mediation, and
international conflict resolution.
I feel a need to explain the writing style that includes a dispro-
portionate use of pronouns and passive voice over my preference
for active voice and acknowledging the contributions of others.
The writing style respects the norms of the UNCITRAL delibera-
tive process where reports are written with pronouns, in passive
tense, and with few references to individuals or organizations in
order to promote candid discussions.4  Even though the public doc-
uments omit names, I will mention some key players and unre-
ported exchanges thanks to the permission that I was given.
Nevertheless, many of the heroes in these stories are sadly omitted
although they are known to people who participated in the drafting
process.
With these writing guidelines in mind, I will discuss the negoti-
ation process and some of the illuminating stories on how key pro-
visions came together.
I. INITIATING THE MEDIATED SETTLEMENT PROJECT
This Project officially started on Friday, March 21, 2014 at 3:54
p.m., at least for me, when I received an email from a Tim Schnabel
with the U.S. Department of State.  He introduced himself as the
U.S. representative to UNCITRAL’s Arbitration and Conciliation
Working Group.  His office, he indicated, was considering propos-
2 IMI is an international organization that develops global standards for mediators, advo-
cates, and others in dispute resolution. See About IMI, IMI, imimediation.org (last visited Aug.
10, 2019). IAM is an organization of peer-selected top commercial mediators from around the
world. See About the IAM, IAM, iamed.org (last visited Aug. 10, 2019).
3 See Part II.C (The three programs are briefly described in note 10).
4 When preparing this article, I was advised that I could safely discuss any information that
is publicly available, but asked not to refer to any discussions that were not expected to be
public. Consultations and informal discussions during breaks are productive in part because par-
ticipants can speak freely without public attribution and need to anticipate reactions of constitu-
encies as they are working through problems.
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ing a project on the enforcement of mediated settlement agree-
ments.  He was interested in my thoughts on whether such a
project would be desirable to pursue.  In our telephone call, he
mentioned that the project idea was initially raised at a State De-
partment’s advisory committee meeting by Professor Stacie
Strong.5  I learned that Mr. Schnabel was systematically reaching
out to various people to figure out whether the enforcement pro-
ject was worth proposing to UNCITRAL.
After several months of consulting with various interest
groups and experts, Tim Schnabel prepared a proposal for future
work to UNCITRAL for its July 2014 Session.  The proposal, for-
mally submitted on behalf of the U.S., was referred by UNCI-
TRAL to Working Group II for evaluation.6
At the Working Group II Session in New York in February
2015, the Delegates along with NGOs and other observer groups
engaged in a thorough review of the U.S. proposal.  The week-long
session was conducted by Michael Schneider, the Swiss Delegate
who served as a diligent and disciplined Chair.  I sat in the room in
awe as a first-time observer.  The Chair tightly managed the sub-
stantive discussions among more than a hundred people represent-
ing 91 States and organizations.  I was especially impressed by his
skill in summarizing what he heard to be sure he understood each
point and his incisive follow-up questions.  He usually posed one or
two probing questions to test the depth of understanding of the
speaker and to delve deeper, although I was less enamored with his
technique when I was in the hot seat.
Mr. Schneider seemed skeptical about the wisdom of this pro-
ject as he engaged with speakers from topic to topic.  For those of
us favoring the project, the meeting was a cliff hanger.  I recall us
trying to guess whether the Chair was inclined toward or against
the project by the questions he asked, his tone, and his body lan-
guage—variables that those of us in the dispute resolution field
5 The idea for the convention was generated at a public meeting of the Department of
State’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law in February 2014. At that meeting,
Professor S.I. Strong of the University of Missouri Law School presented her article comparing
the legal environment surrounding international commercial arbitration with the legal environ-
ment surrounding international commercial mediation and suggested creating a new convention
in the area of international mediated settlements. See S.I. Strong, Beyond International Commer-
cial Arbitration? The Promise of International Commercial Mediation, 45 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL’Y 11 (2014).
6 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Planned and Possible Future
Work—Part III, Proposal by the Government of the United States of America: Future Work for
Working Group II, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/822 (June 2, 2014).
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think we are pretty good at reading.  During the breaks, we shared
our guesses and tried to read the tea leaves, rarely confident about
each of our predictions.  We were acutely aware of how the meet-
ing would end: Depending on how the Chair reads the group, he
would declare a consensus to proceed or not.  We were pleased
that the week ended with a recommendation that the project be
adopted by the Commission.
You can gain an understanding of the thoroughness and range
of discussion by reviewing the detailed Working Group II report
after the session.  It neatly divides the discussion into General Re-
marks, Legal and Practical Questions, Feasibility and Possible
Form of Future Work, and Recommendation to the Commission.7
Working Group II concluded that:
After discussion, the Working Group agreed to suggest to the
Commission that it be given a mandate to work on the topic of
enforcement of settlement agreements, to identify the relevant
issues and develop possible solutions, including the preparation
of a convention, model provisions or guidance texts.  Consider-
ing that differing views were expressed as to the form and con-
tent, as well as the feasibility, of any particular instrument, it was
also agreed to suggest that a mandate on the topic be broad
enough to take into account the various approaches and con-
cerns.  (See the Recommendation to the Commission after Feb-
ruary Working Group II Session at U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832, IV.
D. Paragraph 59 (February 11, 2015)).
II. PROCESS STORY: WORKING GROUP II’S MULTI-PARTY
NEGOTIATIONS
Before exploring the next section on the substantive choices in
the Convention, you might find informative this brief description
of the underlying multi-party process that produced the result.  It
was well-designed, in my view, to fully engage participants in a ro-
bust deliberative process.
Working Group II selected as Chair of this project, Natalie
Morris-Sharma, a member of the Singapore delegation.  Under her
watchful and skillful supervision, she chaired this almost three-year
deliberative process, in collaboration with the expert assistance of
7 Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-sec-
ond session (New York, 2–6 February 2015), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832, paras. 57–59 (Feb. 11,
2015).
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UNCITRAL’s Secretary to Working Group II, Corinne Montineri.
Ms. Morris-Sharma proved to be an impressive Chair due to her
thoughtful use of “consultations” discussed below and active listen-
ing skills.  I was astonished to learn afterwards that she had no for-
mal mediation or facilitation training.  She was a natural.  She
summarized comments succinctly, checked-in with speakers to ver-
ify that she accurately understood what she heard, and proficiently
used open and closed questions to promote sharing and clarifying
information among participants.  She also effectively used instinc-
tive humor that helped lubricate the serious deliberations.  For ex-
ample, when the discussions were moving too quickly at one point,
she triggered collective laughter when apologizing for her hyperac-
tivity while proclaiming that she had not even drank her first cup of
coffee that day.
The Working Group met twice a year for one- to two-week
sessions to deliberate issue-by-issue and draft section-by-section
with input from the EU Commission and various NGOs in the
room.
The consensus-building process featured six methods that
were each employed to produce a productive process.  I thought it
illustrated best practices for managing a large multi-party
negotiation.
A. Whole Group Meetings
Working Group II members primarily met together to deliber-
ate in a General Assembly-style room.  The Chair guided the dis-
cussions for each session by following an agenda and the numbered
paragraphs in a report that was published in advance of each ses-
sion.  She piloted the Working Group with an attentive ear for any
emerging consensus, opportune moments to break for a “consulta-
tion,” and differences that may warrant deferring a topic for later
discussion.
The room set-up placed the State Delegations in the front half
at their delegation tables while the NGOs, regional representa-
tives, and international organizations sat at their tables in the sec-
ond half of the room.  Each seat included an electronic or plastic
placard that displayed the name of the country or organization
along with headsets to connect with one of five simultaneous trans-
lators.  Behind each seat were other chairs with headsets to accom-
modate other members of a delegation or organization.  Some of
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the State Delegations included two to six members so that the
number of people in the front of the room could sometimes reach a
hundred, and the number of NGOs and regional representatives
could add another fifty to seventy-five participants.
The procedure for contributing was simple.  Anyone wishing
to speak could press a speaker button in NYC or turn the plastic
placard upright in Vienna and wait to be called by the Chair.  In
NYC, where there was no screen that listed speakers waiting for
their turn, a speaker did not know how many speakers were in the
queue.  In Vienna, speakers could gauge when they would be called
by seeing the number of placards upright.  Speakers were by and
large savvy in diplomatic language, respectful, substantive, and
worked at maintaining the deliberative thread by referring to prior
presenters’ remarks.  This approach left me feeling that speakers
were mostly listening to each other and not just giving speeches.
B. Consultations
The Chair strategically adjourned meetings for a “consulta-
tion” when she thought that no consensus was emerging on a sig-
nificant issue and informal discussions might help.  She would
frame the issue and invite delegates to meet for thirty or more min-
utes in small groups to develop proposals for the full group.  These
consultations, that were used several times for each session, would
lead to small group meetings, mini-negotiations, and draft propos-
als.  The Chair would move around the floor listening unobtru-
sively to small group discussions and gently offer prompts to help
keep the consultations on track.  The method was exceptionally ef-
fective in resolving some of the most contentious issues.  I think the
consultations succeeded in part because key participants ap-
proached these opportunities with a mindset to learn from each
other and reconcile differences.
C. Educational Programs for the Delegates and Public
Mediation programs were conducted to educate delegates and
the public about issues relevant to key stages of the drafting pro-
cess.  UNCITRAL hosted or co-sponsored three mediation educa-
tion programs that were organized at the initiative of experts in
mediation.  I was asked to organize each of the three programs that
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were each scheduled to coincide with a concurrent Working Group
II session.8  Like other UNCITRAL educational programs, the
goal was to help inform the ongoing deliberative process.  These
programs appeared valuable because most of the state delegates
were more expert on arbitration than mediation.  I leave to others
who attended to judge the programs’ benefits.
D. Contributions by NGOs and EU
UNCITRAL encourages NGOs to attend, participate, and
contribute to working group meetings.  UNCITRAL values the ex-
perience and expertise of NGOs because they reflect the audience
that will ultimately use the texts.  When this new mediation project
was announced, many mediation-related groups registered with
UNCITRAL for observer status and sent representatives to the
meetings.  The format at the sessions made it easy for NGOs to
contribute.  They had full access to documents, were assigned seats
with microphones and headsets, and could offer remarks during
8 After the first Working Group Session in Vienna in September 2015, the Executive Direc-
tor of IMI, Irena Vanenkova, offered to put together a mediation education program for dele-
gates who might be interested in gaining more background on mediation to help inform their
contributions. UNCITRAL responded positively to the offer. IMI asked me to put together a
program and recruited Professor Janet Martinez at Stanford Law School to participate. We de-
signed the first program for the second working group session on February 2, 2016 at the U.N. in
NYC. It compared mediation with the more familiar arbitration process.
After the NYC meeting, there was a sense that another program might be helpful. The
second educational program was held during the next session at the U.N. in Vienna on Septem-
ber 21, 2016. That program was well-timed personally because I went to Vienna on the way to
my son’s wedding in Cyprus the following week! The program was hosted by the Vienna Interna-
tional Arbitral Center and co-sponsored with IMI and IAM. It included the following panelists:
Eileen Carroll, QC (Mediator, Co-founder, CEDR, London), Birgit Sambeth Glasner (Media-
tor, Geneva), Michel Kallipetis (Mediator, London), Allan Stitt (Mediator, Member of Cana-
dian Delegation, Toronto), Josephine Wan-Wen Hadikusumo (Senior Counsel, Asia, Texas
Instruments, Singapore), Norris Yang (Mediator, Former Chair of Hong Kong Mediation Coun-
cil, Hong Kong). I moderated the program that was entitled an opportunity to ask questions of
mediators and users.
After the Vienna meeting, some felt that one more program might be useful. The third
program was held at the next session at the U.N. in NYC on February 8, 2017. It was hosted by
JAMS, and co-sponsored by IMI and IAM. The panel included: Michel Kallipetis (Mediator,
London), Louise Otis (Mediator, retired justice of the Quebec Court of Appeals, President of
the Administrative Tribunal of OECD, Montreal), Dr. Karl Mackie (Mediator, President, Co-
founder, CEDR, London), Pedro Ribeiro (MCIArb, Arbitrator and Mediator, Vice President of
CAMARB—Caˆmara de Arbitragem Empresarial, Brazil), Roland Schroeder (General Electric
Global Litigation Counsel, United States), and Allan Stitt (Mediator, Member of Canadian Del-
egation, Toronto). Similar to the previous program, I moderated it, and we invited participants
to ask questions of mediators and users.
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the formal meetings and freely talk with State delegates on the
floor during breaks and consultations.  NGO representatives par-
ticipated in formal and informal ways as issues emerged.  I will cite
several examples in this section as illustrations although there were
numerous other significant interactions.
An early issue was whether a mediation settlement instrument
was even needed when Working Group II was assessing whether to
recommend proceeding with the mediation project.  At the first
session in February 2015, Professor S.I. Strong of the University of
Missouri Law School, representing the American Society of Inter-
national Law, helped bolster the case for the initiative when she
presented an empirical study she conducted as evidence of the
need for the instrument.9
A second original supporting study was conducted by the In-
stitute for Dispute Resolution at New Jersey City University.  It
was undertaken for IMI and presented at the September 2016 Vi-
enna Session.  The study found that the majority of users and
stakeholders in the survey and at the Global Pound Conference
believed that a global mechanism to enforce mediation settlements
would improve commercial dispute resolution in international busi-
ness transactions.10
Another issue that got my personal attention was whether the
enforcement instrument should apply to only monetary terms in a
settlement.  At the first Working Group II meeting in February
2015, several delegations and at least one NGO representative as-
serted that any instrument should be limited because of the practi-
cal difficulties of enforcing non-monetary terms.  This suggestion
9 The delegates were provided with a preliminary report that was subsequently published as
a law review article. S.I. Strong, Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International
Commercial Mediation, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1973 (2016). See also S.I. Strong, Use and
Perception of International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation: A Preliminary Report on
Issues Relating to the Proposed UNCITRAL Convention on International Commercial Mediation
and Conciliation (University of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2014-
28). Preliminary findings from the study had previously been reviewed by the UNCITRAL Sec-
retariat and the United States and were referenced in documents circulated prior to the Febru-
ary 2015 meeting. See UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes:
enforceability of settlement agreements resulting from international commercial conciliation/medi-
ation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.187, at 6 n.16 (Nov. 27, 2014). See also Comments Received
From States, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Enforceability of Settlement Agreements Re-
sulting From International Commercial Conciliation/Mediation—Revision of the UNCITRAL
Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.188, at 6 n.7 (Dec. 23,
2014).
10 SING. REF. BK., David S. Weiss & Michael R. Griffith, Report on Empirical Study of Busi-
ness Users Regarding International Mediation and Enforcement Mechanisms, 20 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 1133 (2019).
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was alarming, in my view.  If an international treaty restricted en-
forcement to only monetary terms, parties may view mediation pri-
marily for resolving this narrow class of disputes.  This view would
foreclose the full benefits of mediation for uncovering other terms
that may better meet parties’ interests.  After researching whether
enforcement was so limited for enforcing arbitration awards under
the New York Convention (United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New
York, 10 June 1958), I presented to the working group the NY
Convention  precedent and its successful experience with a broader
instrument and the substantive and policy reasons favoring that ap-
proach.  Fortunately, a broader view was ultimately adopted by
Working Group II, and the final convention covers compliance
with all settlement terms.11
Mediation-related NGOs especially rallied at the Vienna
meetings in September 2016 when several difficult questions con-
verged for discussion: Would the convention apply to private par-
ties on an opt-in or opt-out basis?  Should an enforceable
agreement be certified as one that was the product of a private
mediation, and if so, how would it be certified?  And, would a de-
fense to enforcement include certain types of misbehavior by the
mediator, and if so, how narrow would the defense be framed?
These questions fell clearly within the bailiwick of the mediation-
related NGOs, and their representatives offered much formal and
informal input into various proposals.  These questions were ulti-
mately resolved as part of the break-through “compromise” dis-
cussed in the next section.12
As these several examples illustrate, NGOs contributed in va-
rious ways during the drafting process.  They were welcomed by
many State delegations, in my experience.  However, like any
multi-party process, it is difficult to assess the impact of most indi-
vidual contributions.  Nevertheless, I think NGOs can safely claim
that their participation enriched the discussion and understanding
of a number of key issues.
In addition to various NGOs participating, the European
Union (“EU”), as a regional economic integration organization
represented by the European Commission, participated actively
throughout the three years.  EU member states made up more than
11 One delegation, in an effort to find a solution that may appeal to all sides, proposed that
the convention cover non-monetary features with the option for a State to file a reservation to
exclude enforcement of long-term or complex obligations.
12 See Section III.
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25 percent of the delegates on the floor at any meeting.13  They
were ably represented by Norel Rosner, Legislative Officer, who
contributed much to the whole group meetings, during consulta-
tions, and in informal discussions.
E. The Travaux Preparatoires (Official Record
of the Negotiation)
The travaux preparatoires, known as travaux, reports, and sec-
retariat notes, were prepared before each session and at the end of
each meeting day.  These various documents aided the delibera-
tions as they unfolded by creating a record so that participants
could track where they have been and where they were going.
These documents standout for two reasons.  First, they offered
a detailed contemporaneous record of what transpired (issues that
were considered and what was discussed).  Second, there were no
personal names, countries or NGOs associated with the remarks
and exchanges.  The entire written record was anonymous in order
to promote candid exchanges and reduce the need to grandstand
for constituencies back home.
Corrinne Montineri, as the secretary of UNCITRAL Working
Group II, performed the herculean task of preparing the numerous
lengthy documents that aided the working group’s deliberations.
Ms. Montineri, with help from her colleague, Jae Sung Lee, pre-
pared before each upcoming session a provisional agenda, a Re-
port of Working Group II that covered what happened at the prior
session, and a Note by the Secretariat as background and guide for
the session.  Then Ms. Montineri with her colleague prepared daily
“draft” reports of what transpired each day and distributed them
before the next day of meetings.  At the end of each day, she would
return to her office to meticulously prepare the draft report for the
next day while the delegates and other representatives took a
13 UNCITRAL membership of 60 States included 13 members from the EU (21.6%). For
the Working Group II meetings, attendance varied. For the February 2017 Session in NY, for
example, 12 out of the 41 members in attendance were members of the EU (29%) plus 9 more
EU countries as observers. UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on
the work of its sixty-sixth session (New York, February 6–10, 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901 (Feb.
16, 2017). In the last meeting in February 2018, when the final draft was adopted, 12 out of the 33
members in attendance were members of the EU (36%) plus 4 more countries as observers. See
UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-eighth
session (New York, February 5–9, 2018), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934 (Feb. 19, 2018).
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break for the evening to socialize and meet informally before re-
turning for another work day.
These travaux preparatoires are posted on the UNCITRAL
website, making them a widely available source for clarifying and
interpreting the final model law and convention.  You will see
many references to these sources in this article.
F. Voting
Decisions were made by consensus.  No formal voting took
place as a general rule, so I was surprised to learn at my first meet-
ing.  The Chair, Ms. Morris-Sharma, had the responsibility of rec-
ognizing when the working group reached a consensus.  She used
various techniques to test for one.  For example, she would declare
“that not hearing any more comments or disagreements she will
move on.”  That comment would ferret out further concerns if
there were any.  Or, she would invite other comments with the re-
mark that “if there are no more, she will declare a consensus.”
These types of prompts helped surface an emerging consensus or
an occasion for consultation or deferring an issue.  This form of
decision making imposed a heavy responsibility on the Chair to
listen attentively, astutely read the group, and proactively build
consensus.14
These six methods to engage participants were used through-
out the week-long sessions over the almost three years of
deliberations.
III. SUBSTANTIVE STORY: KEY ISSUES AND HOW RESOLVED
This section explains key provisions of the Convention includ-
ing the five-point compromise that likely will be of interest to me-
diation-savvy readers and states that are contemplating adopting
the Convention.  For states that might not be ready to ratify the
Convention, the working group prepared, as an alternative, an
amendment to the Model Law on International Commercial Con-
ciliation.  The Model Law will not be discussed.
14 UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at 6, para. 14.
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A. Article 1. Scope of Application
Article 1 frames the narrow scope of the Convention.
Article 1.1 limits its application to disputes that are interna-
tional, presumably to little surprise, and includes a definition of
international that focuses on the place of a party’s business, where
a “substantial part of the obligations under the agreement is per-
formed,” or where the subject matter is “mostly closely
connected.”
Article 1.2 and 1.3 further limits the scope by specifying what
disputes and settlement agreements are not covered, with limits
that will surprise and disappoint some.
Article 1.2 states that the Convention does not apply to settle-
ment agreements that arise out of consumer transactions or relate
to family, inheritance, and employment law.
Article 1.3 tries to avoid overlap with other enforcement re-
gimes that might apply to mediated settlement agreements.  Some
delegations wanted to avoid duplicating regimes such as the Hague
Conference instrument, while others were fine with states provid-
ing multiple avenues for relief under different instruments.  They
were less concerned with overlap and more concerned about avoid-
ing gaps by other instruments imposing ceilings, not floors.
The Working Group ultimately decided to restrict the scope so
that the Convention would not apply to settlement agreements that
have been approved by a court or concluded in the course of a
court proceeding and would be enforceable as a State court judg-
ment.  Also, it would not apply to settlement agreements enforcea-
ble as an arbitral award.
B. Article 2. Definitions
Article 2.3 offers a definitions section with a surprise that I
suspect will be embraced by much of the contemporary mediation
world.  It replaced the word “conciliation” with the word “media-
tion.”  After UNCITRAL has used the word “conciliation” in the
Conciliation Rules (1980) and in the Model Law on International
Conciliation (2002), Working Group II made this long overdue
word change.  It then labeled the Convention as “United Nations
Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting
from Mediation (italics added).”
The Working Group offered the following explanation:
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. . . the Commission decided to use the term ‘mediation’ instead
in an effort to adapt to the actual and practical use of the terms
and with the expectation that this change will facilitate the pro-
motion and heighten the visibility of the instruments.  This
change in terminology does not have any substantive or concep-
tual implications.15
Although some might object because they think there is a
worthwhile distinction to maintain between mediation as a more
facilitative process and conciliation as a more evaluative process, I
would expect most of the mediation audience will welcome this
change in terminology.
C. Article 4. Requirements for Reliance on Settlement
Agreements
Parties must supply evidence of a “settlement agreement that
resulted from mediation.”  This unexpected proof requirement was
subject to considerable discussion and reflects what the drafting
group characterized as a “balance between, on the one hand, the
formalities that are required to ascertain that a settlement agree-
ment result from mediation and, on the other hand, the need for
the draft convention to preserve the flexible nature of the media-
tion process.”16  It is in this spirit that this proof requirement
should be interpreted.
This requirement was born out of the fear that the Convention
might be used for illegitimate purposes.  Some delegates wanted to
be sure that the treaty would not be used for an illegal scheme like
money laundering or for mediations that are not genuine in the
view of some delegates such as when a couple of friends in a dis-
pute meet in a pub.  It is for these reasons that the Convention not
only requires that the agreement be signed by the parties but also
that there is “evidence that the settlement agreement resulted from
mediation” by one of four ways: the mediator’s signature on the
settlement agreement, the mediator’s signature on a separate docu-
ment indicating a mediation was carried out, an attestation by an
15 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Dis-
putes, International Commercial Mediation: Draft Convention on International Settlement Agree-
ments Resulting from Mediation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/942, at II.B(1) (Mar. 2, 2018).
16 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/942, supra note 15, at II.B(7).
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administering institution, or “any other evidence acceptable to the
competent authority.”17
D. Article 5. Grounds for Refusing to Grant Relief
Article 5 on defenses posed the risk of crippling the Conven-
tion by establishing facially sound grounds for refusing relief that
could be abused.  Some delegates argued that preserving defenses
was vital for protecting parties with a valid reason for not comply-
ing with a settlement agreement.  At the policy level, they offered a
persuasive argument.  But if all or most possible defenses were pre-
served, the Convention would fail to serve its primary purpose of
expediting compliance.  This Article was subject to multiple rounds
of discussion at different meetings including a gallant effort in the
final session to regroup and refine the grounds to avoid overlap.
As this last effort unfolded, I was hoping it would lead to changes
that would reduce the risk of misuse.  The failure to gain consensus
was due to the “need to accommodate the concerns of different
domestic legal systems”18 and left disconcerting space for abuse, in
my view.
Preserving several limited defenses made sense like the oppor-
tunity to present proof that the party “was under some incapacity”
or that the settlement agreement was not binding, was subse-
quently modified, or has been performed.  Other defenses, how-
ever, leave space to ferment trouble by defendants who want to
avoid compliance.
Two troublesome defenses stand out.  One is the defense that
an agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed under the law to which the parties have validly sub-
jected it. . . .”19  Another is the defense that the obligations in the
agreement are “not clear or comprehensible.”20  By asserting these
defenses, defendants may be able to transform this new expedited
process into a more protracted and expensive one similar to the
one before the Convention.  Courts should construe narrowly these
defenses21 and others in view of the purpose of the Convention.
17 Id. at II.A, art. 4.1(a) & (b).
18 Id. at II.B, para. 8.
19 Id. at II.A, art. 5(1)(b)(i).
20 Id. at II.A, art. 5(1)(c)(ii).
21 For the “null and void,” etc. defense, Working Group II specifically states that it intends a
narrow interpretation based on adopting language from the New York Convention. See U.N.
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes, Inter-
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E. “The Compromise”
As the deliberations progressed from semi-annual meeting to
semi-annual meeting, Working Group II resolved the easier issues
while deferring the harder ones.  Among those favoring a Conven-
tion, we feared that when deliberations reached the remaining
more controversial and complex issues, the resolutions risked gut-
ting the instrument.  The fears were palpable in the hallways.  Sev-
eral worrisome questions occupied me: Would the Convention
include a large hole for a stream of legal claims based on mediator
misconduct that would be difficult to prove and would prolong the
compliance process?  Would the benefits be limited to only parties
that elect to opt-in to the Convention?  If so, only diligent parties
who overcome the status quo bias will likely elect an enforcement
process that is supposed to be the better one.  Would the entire
enterprise for a convention be derailed by the argument that for-
mulating global standards is premature for what some viewed as an
incipient field?
These sort of questions among others moved different sides
toward a “compromise proposal.”  The compromise was the result
of numerous discussions among delegates, NGO representatives,
and the EU in full working group meetings, consultations, informal
gatherings, hallways, and over meals.  The five elements of the
compromise were initially “cobbled” together by about a dozen
delegates during lunch on Tuesday, February 7, 2017 and presented
after lunch to the full Working Group.  The timing left the remain-
ing three days of the session to flesh out the details.  And then a
snow blizzard on Thursday closed down the island of Manhattan,
including the UN for the day.  This lost day turned into an opportu-
nity.  Instead of enjoying the freshly fallen snow in Central Park, a
number of delegates and NGOs met at a private law office near the
UN.  They worked together to overcome some final hurdles and
solidify details that could be presented to the full Working
Group.22  The five-point “compromise,” which it became known as,
created a pathway for resolving the remaining most contentious
issues.
national Commercial Conciliation: Preparation of an Instrument on Enforcement of International
Commercial Settlement Agreements Resulting from Conciliation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/
WP.202, para. 43 (July 14, 2017).
22 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901, supra note 13, paras. 51–93.
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1. Opt-out Provision (Convention, Article 8.1(a) & (b))
Should the Convention apply automatically with an opt-out
provision?  Those favoring opt-out argued that the instrument
should apply automatically like the New York Convention applies
to enforcement of arbitral awards.  This approach also would be
consistent with the objective of the instrument to make it easier to
secure compliance with settlement agreements.  Others argued for
party autonomy.  Parties should opt-in only after they understood
how the Convention operates and made an informed choice to do
so.
This party autonomy argument appealed to several mediation
experts, so I learned when preparing for the Vienna expert panel
program in September 2016.  During the evening before the pro-
gram as the panelists were conferring, some panelists expressed
concern that an opt-out provision ran counter to the principle of
party self-determination that forms the foundation for the media-
tion process.  Parties should make an informed choice to use the
Convention, so they argued as some state delegates did during the
meetings.  I was stunned by the resistance because the benefits of
an opt-out provision seemed so obvious.  Instead of the after-din-
ner meeting offering a congenial opportunity to get acquainted
over drinks and prepare for the next day, it turned into an intense
and lively discussion.  We met late into the night as we explored the
pros and cons of opt-in and opt-out and the foundational principle
of party self-determination.
By the end of the evening, I struggled to succinctly frame the
issue as: Would the new instrument offer a better default process
for enforcement than the one now in place without the instrument?
If so, that process should apply subject an opt-out provision.  If not,
I suggested that we should not be supporting the new instrument.
When we reconvened our planning meeting over lunch the next
day, the panel unanimously favored the opt-out approach.  It be-
came apparent to all of us that opt-out favored the default process,
and this enterprise was aiming to fashion a better process for en-
forcing mediated settlement agreements.
Ultimately, the Drafting Group adopted the policy of auto-
matically applying the Convention with an opt-out option for a
party to the settlement agreement.23  Even though the Convention
23 Art. 8 distinguishes between “parties to the convention,” which are Contracting States,
and “parties to the settlement agreement,” which are private parties. For further explanation, see
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/942, supra note 15, at II.B(3).
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omits explicitly authorizing private opt-outs, the understanding is
that parties to a settlement agreement can agree to exclude the
application of the Convention, and the clause will be upheld under
Article 5.1(d) as a defense based on complying with the settlement
terms.24
However, Article 8.1(b) authorizes a State party to the Con-
vention to opt-out of the Convention’s automatic application in a
declaration.  If a State opts-out, private parties can still opt-in to
the Convention by private agreement (such as in the settlement
agreement or the agreement to mediate).
2. Grounds for Refusing to Grant Relief Based on Mediator
Behavior (Convention, Article 5.1(e) & (f))
Some delegates wanted to include a defense to enforcement
based on bad mediator behavior.  They saw a need to protect par-
ties against unfair treatment by a mediator or failure of a mediator
to disclose information that calls into question his or her impartial-
ity.  Initial concerns related to the impact of a mediator’s non-com-
pliance with professional conduct standards or domestic law.
For people in the mediation field, this defense roused fears of
abuse by parties who are looking for an excuse to get out of an
agreement.  Although it is rare that these mediator misbehaviors
occur and have an impact, the claims are theoretically possible, and
some delegates thought should be guarded against.  For many in
the mediation field as advocates or mediators, these claims are fa-
miliar ones that can be asserted by a party trying to avoid a com-
mitment.  These claims also can be used by a party to protract the
compliance process and make it costlier as leverage for re-negotiat-
ing a settlement.
When discussing these concerns at the February 2016 New
York session, it was considered how mediation is different than ar-
bitration.  It was recognized that parties voluntarily use mediation,
a mediator lacked authority to impose a settlement, any resulting
agreement is voluntarily entered into, and parties are free to with-
draw from the process at any time.  At the end of the discussions,
delegates were encouraged to consider before the next meetings in
Vienna whether these mediator misconduct risks might be covered
24 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 13, para. 78; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report
of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-first session (25 June–13 July 2018), U.N. Doc. A/
73/17, at III C.2., para. 68 (2018); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n
on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-first session (25 June–13 July 2018), U.N. Doc. A/73/17, at III B.1.,
paras. 37–40 (2018).
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by other defenses like the public policy defense in the instrument
and to review the practical and judicial experiences in their
jurisdictions.25
At the following Vienna session in September 2016, a drafting
process began with the goal of protecting against these risks of me-
diator misbehavior while limiting the opportunity for abuse and
leverage to renegotiate settlements.  One of the early drafts that
stimulated an energetic drafting process stated:
Draft provision 8 (Grounds for refusing [recognition] and en-
forcement) (key language in italics)26
(1) [Recognition and] enforcement may be refused . . . if that
party furnishes . . . proof that:
(e) The conciliator failed to maintain fair treatment of the parties,
or did not disclose circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable
doubts as to its impartiality or independence.
After much discussion of divergent views, exchange of multi-
ple drafts, and parsing of language that included active participa-
tion by NGOs, the emerging view was that serious mediator
misconduct could probably be covered by other defenses in the in-
strument.  The delegates that wanted additional protections em-
phasized the significant role of the mediator and the need to retain
a defense even if it is difficult to prove a party has been treated
unfairly.  Unlike arbitration, it was asserted by those favoring a
protective provision, there was no means to challenge the media-
tion process or the conduct of the conciliator.
As delegates searched for a proposal that met everyone’s con-
cerns, it was suggested that the scope of challengeable behavior be
limited to when it has a “direct impact on the settlement agree-
ment,” to “exceptional circumstances,” or when the conduct has a
“material impact” or “undue influence.”  It also was suggested that
subparagraph (e) above be divided into two separate subpara-
graphs: one on fair treatment and the other on disclosure.27
25 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of
its sixty-fourth session (New York, February 1–5, 2016), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, paras. 170–75
(Feb. 10, 2016).
26 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Dis-
putes, International Commercial Conciliation: Preparation of an Instrument on Enforcement of
International Commercial Settlement Agreements Resulting from Conciliation, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9WG.II/WP.198, at II.D, para. 35 (June 30, 2016). The final draft became art. 5 in the
Convention.
27 See U.N.G.A., Daily Minutes, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/LXV/CRP.1/Add.4, paras. 5–11
(Sept. 16, 2016) (Draft report, addendum, distributed day after discussions); U.N.G.A., Daily
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\20-4\CAC404.txt unknown Seq: 20 19-DEC-19 7:51
1056CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1037
The final version approved by Working Group II adopted the
two subparagraphs approach and retained narrow defenses that ad-
dressed the underlying goal of protecting parties from a badly be-
having mediator while fashioning language that reduced the risk of
parties exploiting defenses to evade commitments.  The final lan-
guage of Article 5, with italics to highlight safeguards against
abuse, are:28
Section 1(e) There was a serious breach by the mediator of stan-
dards applicable to the mediator or the mediation without which
breach that party would not have entered into the settlement
agreement; or
(f) There was a failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties
circumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s
impartiality or independence and such failure to disclose has a
material impact or undue influence on a party without which fail-
ure that party would not have entered into the settlement
agreement.
3.  Avoid Overlap with Other Enforcement Regimes
(Convention, Article 1.3)
Another issue was whether the compliance mechanism in the
Convention should avoid overlap with other compliance regimes.
As discussed under Article 1.3 on Scope of Application above, the
Working Group decided to try to minimize overlap by not applying
the Convention to settlement agreements enforceable as a court
judgment or arbitration awards.29
4. Defining “Recognition and Enforcement”
(Convention, Article 3)
Another issue was whether to use the language “recognition
and enforcement” of settlement agreements in the Convention, a
phrase that figures prominently and frequently in the New York
Convention on arbitral awards including in its title.30  Because part
of the phrase, “recognition,” has a different meaning in civil law
Minutes, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/LXV/CRP.1/Add.7, paras. 15–18 (para. 18 refers to compro-
mise solution) (Sept. 21, 2016) (distributed day after discussions).
28 For a more complete analysis of this section on mediator misbehavior, including the hur-
dles to proving the defense, see SING. REF. BK., Michel Kallipetis, Singapore Convention
Defences Based on Mediator’s Misconduct: Articles 5.1(e) & (f), 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 1197 (2019).
29 See Singapore Convention art. 1.3(a) & (b).
30 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. I–VII.
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jurisdictions than in common law jurisdictions, delegates wanted to
draft a convention that would reduce the risk of confusion.  It was
not easy at the meetings for me as a common law trained lawyer to
understand the explanations and reconcile the different interpreta-
tions.  The solution fashioned by the delegates was to omit the term
“recognition” and design a separate article, that became the short
and significant Article 3.
Article 3 separated the two concepts.  Article 3.1 covers “en-
forcement” by giving each party to the Convention the right to en-
force a settlement agreement in accordance with the Convention.31
Article 3.2 covers “recognition” without using the term.  Instead,
the “recognition” concept is replaced with a functional definition
that uses other words to address key aspects of recognition such as
the ability to assert a mediated settlement as a complete defense if
another party tries to raise the underlying settled claims.
Other articles in the Convention do not repeat Article 3’s me-
ticulously negotiated and somewhat convoluted language.  Instead,
the other articles use the blanket term “relief” when referring col-
lectively to the concept of “enforcement” in Article 3.1 and the
functional “recognition” description in Article 3.2.32
For a full understanding of this two-paragraph, complex provi-
sion, read Recognition by Any Other Name: Article 3 of the Singa-
pore Convention on Mediation by Timothy Schnabel in the
Singapore Mediation Convention Reference Book.33  In the article,
Tim Schnabel emphasizes the central importance of this Article to
the entire Convention when he points out that: “Yet only Article 3
imposes affirmative obligations on Parties to the Convention.  All
other articles merely play supporting roles, such as placing bounda-
ries on the Convention’s application, setting forth procedural rules
or exceptions, and providing the mechanics for the Convention to
operate as a treaty.  In other words, all the other articles are used
to determine whether and how the Article 3 obligations apply, but
only Article 3 itself imposes substantive duties on states that join
the Convention.”  Those duties are to enforce a settlement agree-
ment in accordance with the terms of the Convention.
31 The term “enforcement” shows up in a few other places but for other purposes. See Singa-
pore Convention arts. 1(3)(a)(ii) & (b), art. 12(4).
32 See the use of the term “relief” in Singapore Convention arts. 4, 5, 6, & 12.
33 See SING. REF. BK., Timothy Schnabel, Recognition by Any Other Name: Article 3 of the
Singapore Convention on Mediation, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1181 (2019).
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5. Two Options for States: Convention or Model Law
Central to the five-point compromise was the dual instruments
proposal.  It resolved a distributive choice that was blocking pro-
gress: Would there be a convention or model law?  The proposal
avoided a choice that would have produced a winner and loser.  It
offered something to both sides.  For those states that opposed a
convention because they wanted more time to gain experience with
mediation and compliance issues, they could adopt the model text
in their domestic law and join the convention later.  For those
states that favored a convention because they are ready for its ben-
efits, they could ratify it under the dual instruments resolution.
The General Assembly, it also was suggested, should not express
any preference between the two options.34
The Working Group formulated this formal resolution to en-
capsulate its goals for adoption by the Commission and for the
General Assembly:
Recalling that the decision of the Commission to concurrently
prepare a convention on international settlement agreements re-
sulting from mediation and an amendment to the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation was in-
tended to accommodate the different levels of experience with
mediation in different jurisdictions, and to provide States with
consistent standards on cross-border enforcement of interna-
tional settlement agreements resulting from mediation, without
creating any expectation that interested States may adopt either
instrument. See A/CN.9/942, II.B Annotations, Paragraph 12 (2
March 2018).
After the five-point compromise was reached, the delegates
wrapped up the drafting process by addressing some standard and
not particularly controversial provisions, although one routine pro-
vision provoked an entertaining exchange with substantive implica-
tions.  It was proposed in the draft provision that the Convention
become effective six months after the third state ratifies it.  During
the discussions, a delegate suggested that the Convention should
not be effective until ten states ratify it, followed by other dele-
gates suggesting other numbers ranging from three and ten ratify-
ing states.  The Chair, using her instinctive humor to make a point,
remarked that this is starting to sound like a bingo game or hag-
gling at a bazaar.  She then asked delegates to support any pro-
posed number with a rationale.  In a very short time, the discussion
34 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901, supra note 13, paras. 89–93; U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/942, supra note 15,
at II.B Annotations, para. 12.
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returned to the original number of three ratifying states and
reached a consensus.35
This last discussion highlighted another feature of the Conven-
tion mentioned by a delegate that is worth noting as a final point.
The Convention is not a bilateral treaty.  It is not limited to compli-
ance with settlements “from” a State that is also a party.  This
means that settlements are subject to the Convention in any coun-
try that is a Party even if the person or entity suing is not from a
country that ratified the Convention.
IV. CONCLUSION—WHAT HAPPENED NEXT?
The recommendations of Working Group II were adopted by
UNCITRAL on June 25, 2018.  On that warm day at the UN in
NYC, delegates and representatives sang a celebratory song com-
posed for the occasion.36  It was entitled “Good Memories” and
was sung to the melody of Home on the Range.  It also paid tribute
to Tim Schnabel’s leadership for moving this initiative forward and
to Singapore for offering to host opening the Convention for
signature.
Oh give me a forum
Where mediation is at home
Where debate and amendments flow free
Where seldom is heard, a discouraging word
And results are here for us to see
Ohhhhh forum to engage, where each of us wrote a page, where
Tim took the lead and we followed with speed—mediation con-
vention hurray
When the work first begun
And the quorum was found
With the New York Convention as guide
We all shared our views
And now we share the news
The Singapore convention is live ohhhh forum to engage . . . .
35 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/942, supra note 15, at II, art. 14.
36 The song was composed by three UNCITRAL members who are too modest to be pub-
licly recognized for their authorship of this original composition for the 51st Commission of
UNCITRAL—New York—25 June 2018.
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At the June 25th Commission meeting, the Commission
adopted by consensus the following decision and recommendation
for the General Assembly:37
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
Recalling its mandate under General Assembly resolution
2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966 to further the progressive har-
monization and unification of the law of international trade and
in that respect to bear in mind the interests of all peoples, in
particular those of developing countries, in the extensive devel-
opment of international trade,
Recognizing the value of mediation as a method of amica-
bly settling disputes arising in the context of international com-
mercial relations,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 57/18 of 19 Novem-
ber 2002 noting the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Conciliation and expressing the con-
viction that the Model Law, together with the UNCITRAL
Conciliation Rules recommended by the General Assembly in
its resolution 35/52 of 4 December 1980, contributes significantly
to the establishment of a harmonized legal framework for the
fair and efficient settlement of disputes arising in international
commercial relations,
Convinced that the adoption of a convention on interna-
tional settlement agreements resulting from mediation that is
acceptable to States with different legal, social and economic
systems would complement the existing legal framework on in-
ternational mediation and contribute to the development of har-
monious international economic relations,
Recalling that the decision of the Commission to concur-
rently prepare a convention on international settlement agree-
ments resulting from mediation and an amendment to the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Concili-
ation was intended to accommodate the different levels of expe-
rience with mediation in different jurisdictions, and to provide
States with consistent standards on cross-border enforcement of
international settlement agreements resulting from mediation,
without creating any expectation that interested States may
adopt either instrument,38
Noting that the preparation of the draft convention on in-
ternational settlement agreements resulting from mediation was
the subject of due deliberation in the Commission and that the
37 U.N. Doc. A/73/17, supra note 24, at III C.2, para. 68.
38 U.N. GAOR, 72nd Sess., supplement no. 17, U.N. Doc. A/72/17, paras. 238 & 239 (2017).
See also U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901, supra note 13, para. 93.
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draft convention benefited from consultations with Govern-
ments and interested intergovernmental and international non-
governmental organizations,
Having considered the draft convention at its fifty-first ses-
sion, in 2018,
Drawing attention to the fact that the text of the draft con-
vention was circulated for comment before the fifty-first session
of the Commission to all Governments invited to attend the
meetings of the Commission and the Working Group as mem-
bers and observers,
Considering that the draft convention has received suffi-
cient consideration and has reached the level of maturity for it
to be generally acceptable to States:
1. Submits to the General Assembly the draft convention
on international settlement agreements resulting from media-
tion, as it appears in annex I to the report of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its fifty-
first session;
2. Recommends that the General Assembly, taking into
account the extensive consideration given to the draft conven-
tion by the Commission and its Working Group II (Dispute Set-
tlement), consider the draft convention with a view to
(a) adopting, at its seventy-third session, on the basis of the draft
convention approved by the Commission, a United Nations
Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting
from Mediation; (b) authorizing a signing ceremony to be held
as soon as practicable in 2019 in Singapore, upon which the
Convention would be open for signature; and (c) recommending
that the Convention be known as the “Singapore Convention on
Mediation”;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to publish the Conven-
tion, upon adoption, including electronically and in the six offi-
cial languages of the United Nations, and to disseminate it
broadly to Governments and other interested bodies.
The General Assembly approved the Convention and the title
as the Singapore Convention on Mediation on December 20, 2018.
The last step started on August 7, 2019 when the Convention
opened for signature in Singapore and 46 countries signed it.39  The
opening ceremony launched the final stage of “ratification, accept-
39 See Singapore Convention art. 11. The official list of signatories that will be updated in
perpetuity can be found on the UNCITRAL website by searching for “Singapore Convention on
Mediation.” See Status: United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Re-
sulting from Mediation, UNCITRAL, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/mediation/conventions/in-
ternational_settlement_agreements/status (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
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ance, approval, or accession” by the states.40  The Convention be-
comes effective six months after the third state proceeds from
signing to adopting the Convention.  Each state has its own re-
quirements for ratification.
I hope that this article will help inform discussions and choices
as states study the Convention, assess its benefits, and decide
whether to adopt it.  I also hope that this article will be of value
after the Convention becomes effective for when parties are imple-
menting and interpreting the Convention.
40 See Singapore Convention art. 14.
